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 The global campaign to eradicate malaria, launched in 1955 and phased out by the 
end of the 1960s, has been dubbed a misguided failure. Although the campaign did not 
come close to achieving its headline objective of eradicating malaria, it did lead to 
enormous and sustained reductions in the burden of malaria in dozens of countries around 
the world. Unfortunately, the world failed to heed the right lesson: global eradication is 
not feasible, but sustained malaria control restricting transmission to low levels is. The 
time has come to resurrect a worldwide effort to control malaria, albeit one not predicated 
on complete eradication of the disease.      
There are four reasons to launch a renewed global campaign against malaria. 
First, the abandonment of control efforts has led to a marked resurgence in disease and 
deaths due to malaria in Africa and parts of Asia, partly because of  the spread of drug 
resistance to first-line drugs and mosquitocides and partly because of the generalized 
collapse of public health services in Africa. The human and economic costs are 
horrendous, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa where malaria costs more than 1 million 
lives annually and 1 percentage point of economic growth per year (1).  Second, 
substantial malaria control is possible by extending the coverage of existing technologies 
to impoverished households and communities.  Third, advances in genomics including 
the completed genome sequences of the mosquito Anopheles gambiae (2) and the malaria 
parasite Plasmodium falciparum (3) offer promising new targets for drug and vaccine 
development (4).  Fourth, MANY NEW PROGRAMS TO SUPPORT A GLOBAL 
CONTROL EFFORT HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED IN RECENT YEARS, although 
lack of funds prevents THEM FROM OPERATING EFFECTIVELY AND AT THE 
NEEDED SCALE.   
Global control efforts from the 1940s to the 1970s virtually eliminated malaria 
transmission in the sub-tropics (see the figure). Malaria became almost wholly a disease 
of the African tropics, where 90 percent of the malaria deaths now occur. The reasons for 
this are that the eradication campaign largely bypassed Africa and that malaria in the sub-
tropics is easier to control because the intensity of transmission is much lower (5, 6). 
Still, successes in the sub-tropics and various sites in tropical regions (7, 8) demonstrated 
that intensive vector control measures combined with stepped-up coverage of medical 
treatment of infected individuals could bring transmission down sharply, and in some 
settings completely.   
The eradication effort was abandoned when it became apparent that eradication 
was not possible. Resistance to DDT, the cornerstone of indoor residual spraying, 
appeared in mosquito vector species; meanwhile, the malaria parasite was becoming 
resistant to chloroquine and other first-line drugs. Yet, even when cases of malaria 
rebounded dramatically in some places (such as Sri Lanka) as a result of DDT-resistance, 
malaria death rates rarely reverted to earlier levels. And even with DDT-resistance, the 
pesticide still proved effective in limiting transmission (9). In short, the eradication effort 
made real and sustained strides, and much more could have been accomplished. A deeper 
reason for abandoning the campaign may have been geopolitical. Malaria control had 
already been achieved in the Southern United States, Southern Europe, Southern regions 
of the Soviet Union, much of Latin America, and large parts of Asia, especially China.  
Moreover, by the mid-1970s, the United States had withdrawn from Vietnam, so that the 
U.S. military evinced a sharply reduced concern for malaria control. Impoverished 
Africans were not on the geopolitical radar screen.   
The end of the global malaria eradication campaign coincided with a general 
downturn in foreign aid. Africa fell into a significant debt crisis in the early 1980s, from 
which it has not yet recovered. Creditor governments and international institutions such 
as the IMF and World Bank pushed for budget cuts in poor countries to make room for 
foreign debt servicing.  Public health spending collapsed throughout Africa and with it 
the limited malaria control efforts that were in place. Spending cuts coincided with three 
other adverse trends in Africa, and parts of India, Southeast Asia and Latin America: (1) 
population growth pushed human settlements into new ecological regions supporting 
malaria transmission; (2) the growth of a “septic fringe” around Africa’s sprawling urban 
settlements where urban transmission could thrive; and (3) the continuing spread of drug 
and pesticide resistance.  
Donor fatalism also took hold in the shadow of the “failed” eradication efforts.  
The World Bank made only two loans in the 1990s specifically designated as malaria-
control loans, to India and Laos, and not a single loan to Sub-Saharan Africa. Research 
programs of the U.S. military and USAID directed at a malaria vaccine or new drug 
development were cut back. The major pharmaceutical companies neglected malaria drug 
discovery or vaccine research because the travelers’ market (visitors from the U.S. and 
Europe to malarious regions) was small and still handled by existing medicines.     
By the late 1990s, much of the African political leadership had become desperate, 
and made a renewed malaria control campaign a pivotal demand during the election of 
the WHO Director-General in 1998.  Roll Back Malaria (RBM) was launched by a 
consortium of the WHO, World Bank, United Nations Development Program, and 
UNICEF in November 1998.  Other initiatives for drug discovery, vaccine development, 
and increased financing of control efforts, were launched including the research-oriented 
Multilateral Initiative on Malaria (MIM, in 1997), Medicines for Malaria Venture (MMV, 
in 1999), and the Malaria Vaccine Initiative (MVI, in 1999). The Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, TB, and Malaria (GFATM, in January 2002) supports the implementation of 
prevention and treatment programs.  All remain woefully under-funded and an effective 
international effort has not yet begun.   
An effective campaign will need to operate on four principles. First, it should 
focus on the most afflicted region, Sub-Saharan Africa.  Second, it should recognize that 
among the major epidemic diseases, malaria control is uniquely site specific, dependent 
on climate patterns, vector ecology and biology, and human activity. Third, the campaign 
should pursue two tracks: increased malaria control (both prevention and treatment) with 
existing technologies, as well as a major investment in R&D for new technologies. 
Fourth, and above all, it should be funded adequately and consistently for at least two to 
three decades if it is to have a chance of success. Current worldwide donor spending for 
prevention and treatment programs is far below $500 million per year (and it is 
symptomatic of the laxity of global control efforts that up-to-date worldwide data have 
not been compiled). Actual needs exceed two billion dollars per year, and probably more 
to fund replacements for chloroquine and other drugs to which resistance has developed.  
Promising new drugs already available but not yet in widespread use include the 
artemisinin-based compounds, developed in the 1970s by Chinese scientists from 
derivatives of the traditional Chinese herbal treatment Qinghaosu. Donors have been 
reluctant to support the introduction of artemisinin into Africa, both because of its high 
unit cost relative to chloroquine and other first-line drugs—chloroquine costs ~10 cents 
for a curative regimen whereas artemisinin costs $1—and out of fear that artemisinin too 
will rapidly generate resistance. To counteract this risk, artemisinin-based compounds 
should be introduced in combination with other anti-malarial drugs. Ironically, the delay 
in sponsoring such an approach is leading to the indiscriminate spread of artemisinin-
based monotherapies through informal drug supply networks in Africa.  
IN REGIONS OF INTENSIVE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (MINES, OIL FIELDS, 
RUBBER PLANTATIONS, URBAN ZONES, TOURIST SITES), CORPORATE  
ANTI-MALARIA EFFORTS BOLSTERED BY PUBLIC SUPPORT CAN MAKE A 
SIGNIFICANT IMPACT (11).  SUCCESSFUL CORPORATE EFFORTS 
GENERALLY RELY ON AN INTENSIVE MIX OF ENVIRONMENTAL VECTOR-
CONTROL MEASURES, INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION FOR WORKERS THROUGH 
MEASURES SUCH AS HOUSEHOLD RESIDUAL SPRAYING, AND CASE 
MANAGEMENT.  RECENT INITIATIVES BY THE WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM 
AND OTHER BUSINESS GROUPS AIM TO LINK THESE CORPORATE EFFORTS 
TO BROADER INTERNATIONAL ANTI-MALARIA CONTROL PROGRAMS, 
OFTEN THROUGH FORMAL PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (12). 
Longer-term solutions will come from new drug discovery and especially vaccine 
development efforts based on recent genomic advances.  No major pharmaceutical 
company reports a major malaria research effort. The Gates Foundation has valiantly 
aimed to spearhead new research by supporting the drug-development MMV and the 
MVI. MMV has the declared goal of developing one new anti-malarial drug every five 
years at a cost of $150 million, or $30 million per year, plus significant “in-kind” 
industry support.  These numbers are below most estimates of drug development costs, 
and are very unlikely to cover the high expenses of drug trials. A reasonable estimate of 
total worldwide public and private annual spending on malaria drug and vaccine research 
is less than $100 million, or less than one-seventh of one percent of the $70 billion or 
more of annual worldwide biomedical R&D, for a disease that accounts for an estimated 
three percent of the worldwide disease burden as measured by disability-adjusted life 
years (13). R&D donor needs for drugs and vaccines are around $1 billion per year on a 
sustained basis, compared with current annual spending of less than $150 million.   
The RBM consortium, headquartered at WHO, should serve as the nerve center of 
a renewed global effort to fight malaria. This consortium should immediately prepare a 
comprehensive strategy that includes an operational multi-year plan of action together 
with a full assessment of donor funding needs. The proposed budget should clearly 
delineate the separate needs for current prevention and treatment programs, largely 
funded through the GFATM and the World Bank; the rapid development, clinical testing, 
and procurement of artemisinin-based and other drug combinations; and the outlays for 
R&D for new drug discovery and vaccine development, including effective systems for 
high-cost clinical trials. Annual outlays by donors must reach several billion dollars per 
year for a generation or so to get malaria under control in endemic areas of Africa and 
Southeast Asia. But this will be a very small price to pay for millions of lives saved per 
year and hundreds of millions of people given a chance to escape from the vicious cycle 
of poverty and disease.  
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FIGURE  LEGEND 
The shrinking range of malaria is depicted by overlaying WHO maps for malaria risk for 
the years1946 (pink), 1966 (red) and 1994 (brown). Source, (13). 
